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A U T H O R James Tyler Chapman
Abstract
My research strove to further the knowledge of 
United States-Iran international relations through 
comprehensive analysis.  I investigated and 
presented information on the internal politics 
of Iran, and I analyzed and commented on the 
organization of the government of Iran.  I critically 
examined the historical scholarship on the affairs 
of state between the United States and Iran, and 
I investigated the current state of affairs and 
prospects for the future.  From this understanding, 
it became possible and necessary for rigorously 
logical and insightful decisions to be made in the 
current political environment in which emotions 
and passions dominate, and I probed and evaluated 
a variety of future policy options for both countries. 
I concluded that direct diplomacy is needed and that 
the process of political engagement remains the most 
likely way to effectively address the areas of policy 
difference between the two countries, rather than 
utilizing the rhetoric of regime change and engaging 
in antagonistic saber rattling.  The United States 
needs to use Iran as a partner in the Middle East to 
make progress on the issues of shared interest and 
to create the opportunity for mutual advancement.
Introduction
In this paper, I investigate and present information 
on the internal politics of Iran, analyze and comment 
on the organization of the government of Iran, 
critically examine the historical scholarship on the 
affairs of state between the United States and Iran, 
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been selected as a Gaines Fellow for my next two 
years at UK.  I was awarded a winter travel grant 
in 2008 and a summer research grant in 2009.  I 
am a Singletary Scholar and a founding member 
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The opportunity to explore this subject as a formal academic inquiry under 
the guidance of Dr. Stempel was a stimulating and rewarding experience.  Dr. 
Stempel’s advice, criticism, guidance, perspective, and wealth of knowledge 
were immeasurably important to me during my work on this scholarly 
pursuit.  I encourage all students seeking an intellectual challenge and the 
opportunity to grow and mature to engage in research.  I thoroughly enjoyed it.
I
James Chapman has written an excellent short analysis that will have 
increasing relevance for foreign policy debates this fall.  His historical 
account of the break in US–Iran relations during the Hostage crisis and the 
aftermath goes a long way toward explaining why we are where we are.
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and analyze the current state of affairs and prospects 
for the future.  I focus on background information 
and the distinctive set of circumstances that lead 
to the establishment of an Islamic government in 
Iran, and I subsequently address the structure of the 
current government.  I critically examine the historical 
scholarship on the affairs of state between the United 
States and Iran, and I propose an answer to how the 
theocracy’s structure and divisions within Islam shape 
Iran’s foreign policy.  Finally, I examine the foreign policy 
implications of the Islamic Revolution and the foreign 
policy of Iran since the Revolution.  I subsequently 
analyze policy options for the future of United States-Iran 
relations and propose possible solutions.  Due to the space 
restrictions for publication in Kaleidoscope, however, I 
have not included this final section and will conduct 
further research in those areas during the summer.
From Monarchy to Theocracy: The 
Genesis of the Islamic Republic
The inexorable correlation between foreign policy and 
domestic conditions is in no country more apparent than 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (Kamrava, 1-5).   Throughout 
its history, Iran has been ruled by absolute monarchy, 
with individual rulers seeking personal advancement over 
the national interest (Bradley, 31-40).  The Constitutional 
Revolution (1905-1911) brought about the introduction 
of the concept of the limitation of powers with respect 
to the Shah.  An event unprecedented in the Arab world, 
it started affecting fundamental change with respect 
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to the attitudes of Iranians toward their government. 
A new constitutional monarchy was established, and 
a legislative body, the Majlis, was created.  Quickly, 
however, the Shah developed aversion for the Majlis, 
and the new constitutional system in general, because 
he became burdened by governing under the rule of law 
under a crown given to him by the people.  He showed 
this distaste by ordering the state military to open fire on 
the Majlis.  This system of governance trudged ahead, 
impeded by a lack of organization, cooperation, and 
coordination, until after World War I and the Bolshevik 
Revolution, at which time Iran was divided into three 
zones— Russian, British, and neural (Atabaki, 1-7).
Not until the rule of Reza Shah (1925-1941) did 
Iran develop a concept of a collective national interest 
with a strong and united central government.  Before 
Reza Shah, Iran’s domestic politics were in turmoil. 
Deep divisions between tribes, religions, social 
classes, and ethnicities plagued the nation, and the 
internal affairs of state were dominated by a lack of 
national unity and a people accustomed to absolutism 
and occupation, lacking in skilled men of state, and 
obsessed by a history of past greatness (Pollack, 3). 
The then Reza Khan led a coup, with the assistance 
of the British, and regained Tehran.  After serving as 
Prime Minister and negotiating the withdrawal of the 
remaining British troops, Reza Khan was appointed 
King by the Majlis and began the Pahlavi dynasty.
Claiming to be against foreign imperialism in Iran, 
Reza Shah attracted the support of intellectuals, clergy, 
and the people (Ghods, 93-100).  However, he quickly 
proved to be hostile to Islamic cultural traditions and 
customs, and as one example of this, he officially 
banned the use of the veil in 1935 to the response of 
a grand popular uprising and the disapproval of the 
clergy.  His foreign policy was a grand balancing act 
between the great powers of the day: the United States, 
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and a strengthening 
Germany.  Using dictatorial methods, he proposed 
sweeping initiatives of westernization, and he was 
perceived to have set the elimination of Islam as a 
political, social, or cultural force as his chief internal aim.
After the Allies’ occupation of Iran at the end of 
World War II, Reza Shah abdicated the throne, and his 
son, Mohammed Reza Shah, assumed control.  The 
new king brought a new era of political freedom and 
participation unthought-of during the rule of his father. 
This rebirth of social and political activism eventually led 
to the oil nationalization movement (1951), the leaders 
of which advocated for the elimination of all British 
influence within Iran as well as true independence 
from foreign manipulation (Martin, 17).  The most well 
known leader was Mohammed Mossadeq, the Prime 
Minister of Iran from 1951-1953.  He was passionately 
opposed to foreign intervention in Iran, and he became 
a vocal advocate for the nationalization of the Iranian 
oil industry until he was removed from office in a 1953 
coup d’état funded by the United States and United 
Kingdom.  This event reinforced Mohammed Reza Shah’s 
control of the country, and his pro-Western viewpoint 
directly contributed to the anti-Western mindset of 
many of the inciters of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Nine years after the coup, in 1962, Mohammed 
Reza Shah declared that he was beginning a series of 
reforms in order to comply with President Kennedy’s 
goals for Third World nations.  As was quickly revealed, 
the object of these reforms was the destruction of native 
agriculture and land redistribution, and the Shah would 
be encouraging now unemployed farmers to move to 
the cities, in effect creating a more Western culture and 
consumer society (Kamrava, 67-68).  This set of six 
bills was passed by referendum (a referendum Imam 
Khomeini would later describe as “mendacious” and 
“scandalous”) under the title, “The White Revolution” 
(Khomeini, 178).  How foreshadowing a name it was 
would be made apparent in due course, as the militant 
clergy and fundamentalist population rose to vocal and 
passionate opposition to these reforms, lead by Khomeini.
Khomeini would formally state in no uncertain 
terms his opposition to the Shah and to the imposition 
of Western culture on the traditional values of Iranians 
in a speech on June 3, 1963.  He declared, “We come 
to the conclusion that this regime also has a more basic 
aim: they are fundamentally opposed to Islam itself and 
the existence of the religious class” (Khomeini, 177). 
In response to the Shah’s naming his bills the White 
Revolution, Khomeini stated, “The religious scholars 
and Islam are Black Reaction!” (179).  He articulately 
called the people of Iran to action against the Shah, using 
religion and history (the Shah’s father provided Khomeini 
an ironically perfect example) as his illustrations.
Within hours, the state police of the Shah had 
contained Khomeini, and he was subsequently imprisoned. 
The popular uprisings that resulted from this were 
unprecedented, and within a year, Khomeini had been 
released from prison and exiled to Turkey, and then Iraq.
So began the long, slow journey toward Khomeini’s 
Islamic Revolution in Iran.  With its foundations firmly 
set, and the seeds planted in the minds of the population, 
the Revolution was brought to fruition with the return of 
Imam Khomeini from fifteen years of exile, glorious in his 
welcome’s magnitude and implications (Stempel, 174).
The Structure of the Islamic Republic
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is the 
governing document of the Islamic Republic, and it 
expresses Khomeini’s ideological vision of a practical 
Islamic state endeavoring toward perfection (Martin, 
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159-166).  “Endorsed by the people of Iran on the basis of 
their longstanding belief in the sovereignty of truth and 
Qur’anic justice,” Iran’s Constitution establishes the basis 
of the government system and the prevailing governing 
philosophies (Article I).  It announced the structure of 
the political, social, cultural, and economic relationships 
within society, and it was approved by referendum on 
March 29 and 30, 1979 “through the affirmative vote 
of a majority of 98.2% of eligible voters” (Article I).
The Constitution opens with the ultimate statement 
of sub-servitude.  The people of Iran merely endorse the 
formation of their country, but do not participate in the 
formation themselves.  That formation is foretold and 
made inevitable by the truth embodied within the Qur’an 
and brought to actuality by Ayatollah Khomeini.  Indeed, 
the central principle of the United States Declaration of 
Independence is that government derives its just powers 
from the consent of the governed.  Unambiguously absent 
is that idea from the Iranian system of government. 
It derives its power from Islam.  As subsequent 
stipulations will show us, it seems overwhelmingly 
as if the Iranian leaders endeavored to create a self-
sustaining nation with a very proud people at its base.
Article II states the belief system on which Iran’s 
new government was founded.  The implications of 
the declared principles cannot be overstated.  The 
first guiding belief of the government is that there 
is one God, He has “exclusive sovereignty and the 
right to legislate,” and it is necessary to submit to 
His commands.  Government is the expression of the 
political aspirations of a nation united in faith so that 
the people may make progress toward Islam’s ultimate 
goal.  The Constitution seeks to establish a framework 
through which the goals of Islam will flourish. 
Therefore, only the most devout of men should have the 
responsibility of administrating the government of Iran.
For Iran, the ultimate power of governance is 
not entrusted to the people, but to “the One God.” 
The Constitution establishes the idea of the Supreme 
Leader as God’s direct representative on Earth, acting 
with His authority as mediator between Him and the 
people.  His commands and legislations are the ultimate 
authority, and the country is founded on “the necessity 
of submission” to Him.  Submission is a central tenet 
in the opening of the Constitution. Despite this, and 
seemingly in opposition to this, the Constitution 
pledges loyalty to the “exalted dignity and value of 
man” and the “negation of all forms of oppression.”
The Constitution establishes that the family unit is 
the basis of society, and providing opportunities for the 
family to strengthen is a chief objective of the Islamic 
Republic (Article X).  The Constitution provides for a 
religious army to pursue jihad and for the establishment 
of a judicial system based on Islamic justice and law 
(Articles CXLIV and CLVI-CLXXIV, respectively).
Iran is further founded on the belief in God’s perfect 
justice in His legislation.  The social justice measures 
of the Iranian government are based on this notion of 
justice, as it exists inextricably simultaneously in both 
the government and religion.  “Continuous leadership 
and perpetual guidance” by the religious clerics and 
ayatollahs is also established, claiming that those 
principles have a “fundamental role in the uninterrupted 
process of the revolution of Islam” (Article II).  “The 
exalted dignity and value of man” is praised, and from 
this assumption comes the doctrine of the “negation of 
all forms of oppression… and of dominance” (Article II). 
In accordance with these rather idealistic goals, 
the Constitution outlines sixteen specific duties of 
the government, from “the complete elimination of 
imperialism” to “the elimination of… all attempts to 
monopolize power” (Article III). One duty is particularly 
frightening in its implications.  It gives the Iranian 
government the power to control and manipulate the 
press and media under the auspice of “raising public 
awareness” (Article III).  Another gives the government 
the right to impose universal military training for the 
sake of safeguarding Iran’s independence and Islamic 
order (Article III).
When considering foreign policy, one duty is striking: 
“framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis 
of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, 
and unsparing support to the mustad’afiin of the world” 
(Article III).  Articles CLII-CLV specifically address the 
foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  It is based 
upon the “rejection of all forms of domination, both 
the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation 
of the independence of the country in all respects and 
its territorial integrity, the defense of the rights of all 
Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonic 
superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful 
relations with all non-belligerent States” (Article CLII).
This idea of a single Muslim nation with a people 
united behind a common religion and heritage is 
important, and the fact that it appears so readily stated 
in multiple instances in the Constitution is revealing 
and significant.  It is also strikingly similar to the 
policy of the former Soviet Union, the unification of all 
Communist former countries and the recruitment of the 
working classes of all other countries.  The Constitution 
continues to set limits on freedom in its proposition that 
only three non-Islamic religions are recognized by the 
state: Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity.  All 
Muslims are bound to treat non-Muslims with ethical 
norms and principles of Islamic justice, as long as they 
are not engaging in conspiracy against Iran. (Article XIII).
All people of Iran enjoy equal rights, according 
to the Constitution, but in a slightly Orwellian 
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fashion: “all citizens of the country, both men and 
women, equally enjoy the protection of the law… 
in conformity with Islamic criteria” (Article XX). 
“The restoration of [women’s] rights” is called for in 
Article XXI, but a review of the history of Iran shows 
that progress in this area has been less than ideal.
All laws shall be based on Islamic criteria. 
Deliberative bodies shall be formed to comply with 
verses from the Qur’an.  Freedom, independence, unity, 
and territorial integrity are inseparable.  No authority 
has the right to infringe in the slightest way upon the 
political, cultural, economic, and military independence 
of the Iran under the pretext of exercising freedom.
The basic guarantees of the American Bill of Rights 
are also guaranteed in the Iranian Constitution with 
the all-important stipulation that the exercise of those 
freedoms does not conflict with the basic tenets or 
foundation of Islam, which may be, of course, interpreted 
in the manner deemed worthy by the Supreme Leader.
The economy is one of significant socialism.  The 
Constitution states that the government of Iran will 
endeavor to uproot poverty and deprivation, and it will 
supply to all citizens “the provision of basic necessities 
for all citizens: housing, food, clothing, hygiene, medical 
treatment, education, and the necessary facilities 
for the establishment of a family” (Article XLIII).
The question of the actual structure of the 
government is answered next.  Highest power is 
reserved for the Supreme Leader.  Khomeini assumed 
this role first, and Ali Khameini has been the Leader 
since Khomeini’s death in 1989.  The Leader sets the 
general priorities of the government and the national 
guiding principles of the country.  He is the Commander 
in Chief, and he appoints the head of the Judiciary, 
the news agencies, half of the members of the Council 
of Guardians, and various other heads of agencies.
The Council of Guardians is a body of twelve, 
half of whom are appointed by the Leader and half 
of whom are appointed by the head of the Judiciary, 
who was previously appointed by the Leader.  The 
Council of Guardians oversees the activities of 
Parliament, determines shari’a (Islamic law and 
Qur’anic commandments) compatibility, and qualifies 
candidates for parliamentary elections.  It has veto 
power over any act of Parliament.  A second advisory 
group is the Expediency Council, which was formed to 
mediate disputes between Parliament and the Council 
of Guardians.  Its thirty-four members are conservative 
and usually side with the Council of Guardians.  As 
a result, it is now effectively the advisory body to 
Leader, although it is subject to internal manipulation.
The second highest-ranking official in the Iranian 
government is the President, who is popularly elected for 
a four-year term, renewable once.  He is responsible for 
the day-to-day workings of the Iranian government, but 
he does not set state goals or ideals.  The entire executive 
branch is subordinate to the Supreme Leader.  The 
legislative power is vested in the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly (also known as Parliament or Majlis), the 
body of the people’s representatives elected directly 
every four years.  Eligibility for candidates for Parliament 
is determined by the Council of Guardians, which is 
effectively entirely appointed by the Leader.  Essentially, 
the Supreme Leader can dictate if a person is not eligible 
for holding a seat in Parliament, which has dangerous 
ramifications for the future of a functioning government.
The final elected body is the Assembly of Experts, 
a group of eighty-six clerics popularly elected for 
terms of eight years.  Candidates for a position in 
the Assembly are investigated and approved by the 
Council of Guardians.  The Assembly’s main duty 
is to elect and confirm the Supreme Leader when 
the position becomes vacant.  The group is similar 
to the Vatican’s Council of Cardinals in its duties.
The implications of this structure are numerous. 
Foremost is that the Supreme Leader has effective 
control over all levels of the government.  If he does 
not have direct control, he has surrogate control 
through appointees.  Lucidly explicated by Noori in his 
work, Islamic Government and Revolution in Iran, the 
Constitution makes palpable the philosophy that the 
Islamic idea of state only claims that law is of divine 
origin, not the rulers or the government itself (14). 
Islamic government is also founded on the principles 
of eradicating inequality and pursuing social justice.
Noori presents six distinctive features of Islamic 
government that demonstrate its uniqueness in the 
international community.  First, the Islamic state is 
“founded on an ideological basis in which an individual’s 
geographical, national, ethnic or linguistic background 
does not play any part.”  Essentially, the Islamic state 
is united by a quality deeper than any superficial traits. 
Second, the Islamic state is dedicated to humility and 
“unequivocally opposed” to pompous ceremonies and 
lavishness.  Third, Noori claims that Islamic government 
is “the most inexpensive form of government” since 
it dispenses with troublesome bureaucracy and other 
inconsequential institutions, although in practice, such 
an absence has not come to fruition.  Fourth, the eminent 
concern of Islamic government is not economics.  Fifth, 
the importance that Islamic government places on the 
spiritual and moral soundness of its leaders sets it apart 
from other governments.  Last, the Islamic state is free 
of deception and deceit.  The preeminent, guiding force 
of Islamic government is the goal of creating the perfect 
society, with all people united in philosophy (26-29).
As Buchta notes, the Shi’a clergy have increasingly 
consolidated their political power and their control 
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over all levels of the government (xi).  Substantial 
informal power structures exist within the Iranian 
government as well.  For a substantial and compelling 
treatment of the relationships between officials within 
the Iranian government, see Buchta’s Who Rules 
Iran?: The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic.
According to Amuzegar, the Finance Minister and 
Economic Ambassador in Iran’s pre-1979 government, 
“Khomeini’s promise of a just and free Islamic 
society has proven a sham. After nearly a quarter-
century of theocratic rule, Iran is now by all accounts 
politically repressed, economically troubled, and 
socially restless. And the ruling clerical oligarchy 
lacks any effective solutions for these ills” (1).  His 
observation is insightful and revealing of the true 
accomplishments of the Islamic Republic.  Khomeini’s 
grand promises of an ideal, peaceful Islamic society 
have not come to fruition in what Mafinezam and 
Mehrabi call “a legacy of unsustained achievements” (3).
The bewildering ideology of the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran, which sought to move society back to the 
seventh century and the era of the Prophet Mohammed 
in an atmosphere of complete religious control, 
contrasts heavily with the ideology of other revolutions 
that sought to usher in eras of freedom and new 
ideas (Bozeman, 388).  Present in the Constitution 
and the methods of governance are a multitude of 
contradictions and incongruities, but also the foundations 
of a crudely unrefined, but functioning, government.
The Evolving Relationship 
between the United States and Iran
Formal diplomatic relations were established between 
Iran and the United States in 1883.  Much of the early 
contact between Iranians and Americans, however, 
came in the form of American missionary action.  The 
majority of these missions aimed to convert Iranians 
to Christianity.  The American Presbyterian Mission 
founded the first missionary school in Iran in 1835, 
forty-eight years before the two nations established 
official relations (Heravi, 10-12).  In the earliest years 
of the two countries’ diplomatic efforts, general 
ignorance on the part of the American people and the 
American government of Iran dominated the exchange 
of ideas, and a vague, idealistic idea of Iran was 
pervasive throughout the United States government.
In 1856, the United States and Iran signed the 
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce mutually declaring 
the principles of friendship and commerce between 
the two nations and pledging to sustain “a sincere and 
constant good understanding” of each other (Alexander 
& Nanes, 3).  In spite of President Buchanan’s advice 
and due to the American Civil War, a legation was not 
established in Tehran until twenty-seven years after 
the signing of the treaty.  The formal establishment 
of the American legation in Tehran occurred on 
June 11, 1883, with the presentation to the Shah of 
Minister Benjamin’s credentials.  By 1888, the Iranian 
diplomatic party had arrived in Washington and had 
received its first audience with President Cleveland.
By 1896, a movement had begun in Iran calling 
for a constitution and a legislative body.  After the 
movement formally stated its set of principles, the 
American minister in Tehran, Richmond Pearson, 
relayed a pessimistic message to the U.S. State 
Department, stating his observations and beliefs:
1. The great body of the Shah’s subjects 
have no idea of the meaning of constitutional 
government.
2. The majority of the people are illiterate.
3. There is no middle class, whose interests 
could form the basis and the guarantee of 
constitutional government.
4. Iran is still largely a feudal state.
5. The concept of autocracy is more accepted 
than democracy.
6. It is generally believed that the Mujtahids, 
who sided with the reformers or revolutionists 
in the recent agitation and whose influence 
gained the victory for that party, will soon 
return to their traditional support of autocratic 
ideas (Herlavi 18-19). 
To complicate matters, in 1904, the Reverend 
Benjamin Labaree was murdered in northwestern Iran. 
This event was “the one important event in Persian-
American relations up to that time” (Yeselson, 82). 
The Labaree affair brought about an analysis of the 
existing diplomatic relations between the United States 
and Iran, and it revealed the dangers of missionary 
work in Iran.  While the final settlement between the 
two governments favored the American standard of 
justice, the Labaree affair also forced the United States to 
become unduly involved in the course of Persian justice. 
After the slight crisis of the Labaree affair, 
a Constitution was successfully constructed and 
implemented.  Muzaffaru-Din Shah, who had granted 
the Constitution legitimacy, died, and his successor, 
Mohammed Ali, “immediately tried to undermine the 
Constitution” (Herlavi 20).  Ali’s desire to rule as an 
absolute monarch resulted in the Constitutional Crisis 
of 1907-1909, during which the “American attitude 
was one of non-intervention” (Herlavi 20).  After Ali’s 
abdication in 1909, the United States again pledged full 
support for his successor, the twelve-year-old Crown 
Prince Ahmad, who would rule under the regency 
of Azed Al Molk.  The Labaree affair and the change 
from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy 
fundamentally changed American-Iranian relations.
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In what James Goode called “the diplomacy of 
neglect,” the United States pursued a course of non-
intervention in Iranian affairs.  For example, the United 
States did not come to Iran’s help when the Iranians 
felt a sense of danger because of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention, which they interpreted as an attempt 
to partition Iran into one British and one Russian 
zone of influence.  Consistently, the Iranians sought 
America’s help to lessen the perceived European 
influence in their country, but despite its willingness 
to help, the United States was reluctant to provide 
assistance.  As Yeselson stated, “America’s more 
positive role in world affairs in the twentieth century 
did not include the translation of such pro-democratic 
sentiments into an official policy of encouragement 
for revolutionary movements overseas” (88).
In 1911, under President Taft’s order, the United 
States sent W. Morgan Shuster to head an American 
financial mission in Iran to help mend the Iranian 
economy.  There was one caveat, however.  The mission 
was, by order of the State Department, in no way 
representative of the United States government.  The 
men were simply private citizens being employed by a 
foreign government.  Shuster’s mission did nothing to 
alter Washington’s policy toward Iran, but it did help 
increase the positive public support of Iranian issues 
(Heravi 30-34).  Yeselson has called the Shuster mission 
“the high point of America’s prestige [in Iran]” (228).
At the outbreak of World War I, Iran quickly 
informed the United States of its neutrality, although its 
neutrality was routinely violated by Russia, England, 
the Ottoman Empire, and Germany.  As previous years 
of relations would indicate, the period of war did not 
see much interaction between the Iranian and American 
governments.  Iran subsequently asked for “assistance 
of the United States Government in securing for [Iran] 
representation in the peace conference which will 
convene at the termination” of the war (Heravi 36). 
At Britain’s insistence, however, Iran was not offered 
a voice.  The world was enlightened quickly thereafter 
of the secret negotiations happening between Iran and 
Britain.  On August 10, 1919, a secret treaty between 
Britain and Iran was made public, and the response 
from the United States was highly unfavorable.  In the 
treaty, Britain promised to take a much more proactive 
role in Iranian affairs than the United States had done 
in the past, but Britain still denied that Iran would 
become a protectorate or a quasi-colony.  Britain would 
maintain this position of preeminence in Iranian affairs 
until 1921, when the newly established leadership 
of Reza Pahlavi nullified the treaty and effectively 
showed Britain that foreign countries would not be 
allowed influence under Iran’s new nationalism.
In 1925, after being crowned Shah, Pahlavi began to 
modernize Iran, fusing nationalism and westernization. 
After witnessing the failure of British leadership, the 
debacle of Russian influence, and the perceived neglect 
given by the United States, Reza Shah set the goal 
of Iran becoming independent of foreign influence. 
During this same time, Iran was requesting various 
American advisors for the Ministries of Finance, 
Commerce, Agriculture, Public Works, and other similar 
governmental agencies.  With limited involvement in 
the internal affairs of Iran, the United States maintained 
a relatively consistent state of relations with Iran until 
the outbreak of the Second World War (Heravi 58).
“Prior to World War II, indifference and ignorance 
characterized the American attitude toward Iran” 
(Hamilton 2).  By the early 1940s, however, after a 
sequence of diplomatic missions, many Americans 
were aware of Iran.  In fact, in 1942, during the war, 
Iran asked for yet another American financial minister 
in Tehran.  This final mission ended in 1945 after 
the Iranian Parliament voted to repeal the minister’s 
financial powers after a series of unpopular decisions.
By 1946, after two world wars, American – 
Iranian relations had undergone a transformation. 
By engaging in World War II, the United States had 
clarified its stance on world affairs and altered its policy 
of isolationism.  The United States had pledged full 
support for Iran.  Following Iran’s 1943 declaration of 
war against Germany in hopes of gaining membership 
in the United Nations, the governments of Iran and the 
United States reached an agreement in 1944 to elevate 
the United States Legation in Tehran to an Embassy, 
corresponding with the regard given to both countries’ 
diplomatic missions.  Accordingly, President Roosevelt 
announced, “Iran and America have every reason 
to be close friends” (Heravi 102).  Nevertheless, the 
American-Iranian partnership remained, as Alexander 
and Nanes deemed it, “a peripheral relationship” (1).
Over the years, the Department of State provided 
aid to support Iran’s independence, territorial integrity, 
political and economic progress, and overall sovereignty. 
The United States became a mediator in the English- 
Russian power struggle in the region.  In due time, the 
United States had, of self-interested necessity, replaced 
Great Britain as the major Western influence in the 
Middle East in the post-war period.  Finally, the stage 
was set for the United States to feel justified in defending 
Iran against possible aggression from Soviet aims.
U.S. involvement was secondary to the interests 
of Great Britain and Russia until its help as a neutral 
state in the conflict became necessary, in the eyes 
of the Iranians, to “fend off incursions on [Iran’s] 
independence” (Stempel, 59).  The level of participation 
by the United States steadily increased during the post-
war and Cold War period until the dramatic events 
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of the Islamic Revolution.  The United States’ policy 
of Soviet containment was logically extended into 
the Persian region, and the Soviet Union’s military 
presence in Iran was eliminated after the arrival of the 
Americans.  While the United States helped improve 
Iran economically and politically, it also provided 
a promising and demanding market for Iranian oil. 
Although Gasiorowski claims that the United States 
was attempting to construct “a client state” in Iran, 
the U.S. was truly more interested in ensuring that 
Iranian oil and other resources made it to the market. 
While the United States certainly had self-interest in 
mind in its dealings with Iran, its own advancement 
was not its sole concern.  With increased involvement 
and a growing interest in the well-being of the United 
States’ strongest ally in the Middle East, the United 
States increasingly became interested in supporting 
the actions of the Shah, and it did not recognize or 
foresee the fermenting problems resulting from Western 
impositions on the traditional lifestyles of Arab Muslims.
Iran’s call for a neutral third party to counter the 
Anglo-Russian conflict within Iran led directly to the 
end of the hesitancy shown in the formative years of 
the United States – Iran partnership.  Responding to 
that call, slowly at first, the United States gradually 
became more involved in both the internal and external 
affairs of Iran.  America did, however, eventually 
become more concerned with Iran’s strength as an 
ally than America’s ability to help Iran’s political and 
economic well-being.  Through the various American 
missions to Iran, relations strengthened, and America’s 
growth as a world power paralleled Iran’s growing 
sense of nationalism and desire for independence.
On the eve of the revolution, divisions had become 
apparent in America’s perception of Iran and the actual 
reality.  Most Iranians came to view the United States 
as “chained to the Shah in negative ways” (Stempel, 
80).  As mentioned in the opening paragraph of this 
paper, the Nixon years brought about increases of 
support from the United States for Iran, and America 
became inextricably bound to the actions of the Shah.
The Interplay of Structure and Islam 
in Iran’s Foreign Policy
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran establishes 
a government based on “the complete elimination of 
imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence” 
(Article III).  This rejection of foreign manipulation is 
a logical consequence of the establishment of a society 
based on absolute submission to the ultimate authority, 
the laws of the Islamic faith.  Article III also states the 
chief organizational principle of Iranian foreign policy: 
the government is responsible for “framing the foreign 
policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, 
fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing 
support to the mustad’afiin of the world.”  Even Article 
XLIII, an article concerning the economic organization 
of Iran, states that the “prevention of foreign economic 
domination over the country’s economy” will be a 
guiding force behind the establishment of the economy.
As an apparent insult to and rejection of previous 
policy, Article LXXXII simply states that “the employment 
of foreign experts is forbidden, except in cases of necessity 
and with the approval of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly.”  Previous Iranian policy had supported the 
hiring of American experts to aid the Iranian ministers in 
different policy areas, and the new Islamic constitution is 
purposefully breaking with this tradition from the past.
Articles CLII-CLV specifically are dedicated to the 
foreign policy of Iran, and they explicate a clear and 
consistent vision.  Their brevity accentuates their stark 
message.  Article CLII states the Iranian vision clearly: 
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of 
domination, both the exertion of it and submission 
to it, the preservation of the independence of the 
country in all respects and its territorial integrity, 
the defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-
alignment with respect to the hegemonist [sic] 
superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually 
peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States.
Article CLIV states with similar clarity a second 
crucial foundational principle of Iranian foreign policy:
The Islamic Republic of Iran… considers the 
attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of 
justice and truth to be the right of all people of the 
world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining 
from all forms of interference in the internal affairs 
of other nations, it supports the just struggles of 
the mustad’afun against the mustakbirun in every 
corner of the globe.
Apart from the establishment of certain principles in 
the Constitution, the power structure of the government 
of Iran comments on the country’s attitude toward 
international affairs.  The ultimate authority of the 
Supreme Leader, God’s representative on Earth, and 
his ability to arbitrarily set governmental policy is 
indicative of the country’s willingness to allow decisions 
to be made without deliberation or an open and honest 
discussion of the varying policy avenues available.  The 
Supreme Leader is also declared, in Article CX of the 
Constitution, to have “supreme command of the armed 
forces” and to have control over the “declaration of war 
and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces.”
The ultimate power of the Supreme Leader in the 
realm of international relations parallels his ultimate 
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authority in all areas of Iranian life.  The entire system 
of Islamic governance is based on his power as the one 
official representative of Islam, but internal conflicts 
between members of the bureaucracy also have helped 
shape the functioning of the Islamic government.
Similarly, Iran’s championing of “independence, 
freedom, and rule of justice and truth” in one 
of the Constitution’s statements establishing the 
principles of foreign policy appears slightly hypocritical 
in light of a dispassionate examination of Iran’s 
record.  Thus, both the organization of Iran’s 
government and the powers of the Supreme Leader 
contribute to the formation of Iranian foreign policy.
Shia Islam is the official religion of Iran, and this fact 
is important in the creation of Iranian foreign relations. 
Shi’ism holds that the only legitimate successors to 
the Prophet Mohammed are linear descendants in his 
bloodline.  From the time of the death of Mohammed, 
however, Sunni Islam has been dominant, holding that 
the member of the Islamic community best qualified 
to lead to the community should assume leadership 
and power.  Not until the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic did Shi’ism dominate a country’s religious 
atmosphere or did the leaders of a country profess belief 
in Shi’ism.  Sunni Muslims historically have been the 
politically dominant force in countries with large Muslim 
populations.  Even in Iraq under the reign of Saddam 
Hussein, where the majority of the population is Shia, the 
Sunnis controlled the government. Shi’ism’s rise in Iran 
emboldened Shi’ites worldwide, and Iraq was especially 
impacted by these invigorating revolutionary feelings.
With the establishment of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, however, Shi’ites controlled the actions of a 
country.  Shi’ism is based on a more pessimistic view 
of human nature; it assumes, in opposition to Sunnism, 
that humans can neither find salvation nor manage their 
own affairs without divine guidance.  Shia religious 
leaders presume a certain amount of political power 
because of their more prophetic and messianic roles.
The implications of Shi’ites in the seats of power 
are numerous.  Shia as a ruling philosophy has many 
ramifications.  Iran, as a Shi’ite country, seeks to 
hasten the day of the advent of perfect divine justice 
brought about by the second coming of the Twelfth 
Imam.  Advocating and participating in jihad is one of 
the clearest ways to further the Twelfth Imam’s vision 
of a worldwide Islamic community, and to accelerate 
his return.  Shi’ites are also, generally, more favorable 
toward violent, revolutionary action to further their 
political goals.  There is a fundamental difference 
of temperament between Shia and Sunni Muslims.
Shia Islam also fully embraced nationalism within 
Iran and in other countries throughout the Middle East, 
as it capitalized on the discontent many Shi’ites felt at 
being constantly referred to as “lesser Arabs.”  Their 
desire to change their perception led to some of the more 
extreme actions observed by the world by Shia Muslims.
The idea of the Supreme Leader, who is absolutely 
influential in matters of foreign policy, is directly a 
consequence of Shia Islam.  Khomeini saw himself as 
representative of the proper successor to Mohammed 
and, like Plato’s philosopher-kings, perfect for creating 
and maintaining an ideal government and society. 
Throughout the history of Shi’ism, martyrs were glorified 
and exalted, from the original death of Imam Husayn, 
the fighter against Sunni tyranny, who was killed at 
the Battle of Karbala and whose day of death marks 
the Muslim holiday of Ashura.  Invoking feelings of 
religious pride, and evoking messianic images and ideas, 
Khomeini rose to absolute power in the Islamic Republic. 
The leftist, socialist tendencies of the Islamic Republic 
are a direct consequence of radical nature of Shi’ism and 
the time period in which the country was conceived.
Clearly, both the structure of the Islamic Republic 
and the core beliefs of Shia Islam influence the foreign 
policy of Iran.  An explanation of such would be 
incomplete without consideration of both characteristics.
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